Uneed started as a niche directory of tools for front-end developers, built originally just to try out the Next.js framework. Thomas added a submission form (using a third-party form SaaS) and passively collected submissions. The product got no deliberate early-user acquisition effort — growth was organic and slow. The inflection point came when Thomas received an automated email from the form SaaS saying he had hit his free-tier submission limit. This was his signal that demand existed. He began manually adding one product per day to manage volume, which created a waiting list that eventually stretched 2–3 months long. He then monetised the waitlist by charging $30 to skip the queue and get listed immediately — this was his first revenue and effectively validated the concept. The pivot to a launch platform was triggered by a viral tweet from indie hacker Nikita Nikiforov (Nikico) criticising Product Hunt. Thomas saw the tweet, recognised he already had a directory full of tech products, and decided to reposition the site as a Product Hunt alternative focused on indie hackers and bootstrappers. He leveraged the existing directory content as his initial product catalogue rather than starting from zero.
Uneed
Product launch platform for indie hackers and bootstrapped startups, alternative to Product Hunt
9 moves, in order
- Pre launch / OriginOrganic directory submissions
Built a niche directory of front-end developer tools to experiment with Next.js. Added a submission form and let products accumulate passively. When the form SaaS hit its free limit, Thomas recognised latent demand and began manually adding one product per day, creating a waiting list.
Waiting list grew to 2–3 months long, signalling strong organic demand - First monetisationPaid waitlist skip
Charged $30 for founders to skip the 2–3 month waiting list and get their tool published immediately. This was the first revenue mechanism and required zero marketing — demand already existed from the queue.
First revenue generated; approximately $2K MRR reached before the pivotMRR $2.0k - Pivot to launch platformTwitter trend surfing
Spotted a viral tweet from Nikico criticising Product Hunt and immediately pivoted the directory into a Product Hunt-style launch platform targeting indie hackers. Repositioned the existing catalogue as launch history and rebranded the value proposition.
Revenue dropped from ~$2K to ~$400–500/month post-pivot as the product was rebuiltMRR $500 - Early growth — Twitter as primary acquisitionTwitter — organic
Used Twitter/X consistently as the main acquisition channel, posting regularly to build personal brand and drive awareness of Uneed launches. At this stage Twitter accounted for approximately 70–80% of all traffic.
Twitter became dominant traffic source (~70–80% of all visits) - SEO build upSeo programmatic
Built SEO pages leveraging the growing product catalogue: alternative/comparison pages (e.g. 'best alternatives to Screen Studio'), detailed product pages, and an internal backlinking structure. Also implemented a badge system (similar to Product Hunt's) so launched products place a backlink on their own websites, compounding domain authority over time.
SEO became ~20–30% of traffic; comparison/alternative pages rank well on Google - Community retention / gamificationProduct gamification
Identified a core segment of daily returning users who treated Uneed like a game. Introduced a 'karma' system: logging in and upvoting products earns karma, and higher karma grants an upvote multiplier — making active users' votes count more. This differentiated Uneed from Product Hunt and rewarded loyal community members.
Direct/returning traffic grew to become the #1 traffic source (>50% of visits); top daily products are now driven by active community members rather than random visitors - Newsletter launchEmail newsletter
Launched a weekly newsletter highlighting the best products of the week and month. Grew to 12,000 subscribers with a 40% open rate (list cleaned weekly). Monetised with ad spots at $90/issue, sending 4 issues/month. The newsletter also drives more traffic to featured products than their actual launch day on Uneed.
12,000 subscribers, 40% open rate, ~$360/month in newsletter ad revenueUsers 12k users - Black Friday push — month of $20KBlack friday promotion
In November, Thomas shifted to approximately 80% marketing / 20% development. Ran a Black Friday campaign that was the direct catalyst for hitting $20K MRR for the first time.
Hit $20K MRR for the first timeMRR $20k - Community feature (Uneed Community)Owned community
Reached out to highly active but low-social-media-presence users and offered to build an internal social feed (Twitter-like) within Uneed so they could share their journeys without algorithm pressure. Built basic posting features tied to product profiles. Goal was retention/fidelisation, not new user acquisition.
Reached 7,000+ posts in first month; increased daily engagement from core user base
Thomas had a pre-existing directory with a large catalogue of tech tools and an established submission pipeline, giving Uneed a content base that a brand-new competitor would not have. He also benefited from perfect timing — launching a Product Hunt alternative right as public frustration with Product Hunt peaked, with very few serious competitors at that moment.
direct_traffic_and_community_retention
Affiliate links on SEO pages generated only a few hundred dollars per month despite significant traffic — Thomas attributes this to the fact that most Uneed users are direct/returning visitors who never land on those SEO pages. SEO traffic also attracts the wrong user type (casual visitors, not active community members who submit and vote on products).